Discrediting Ukrainian generals: statistics speak and show

 

The war of anonymous trolls, bots and one-day characters grew into a war of opinion leaders and pumped-up political brands last summer. At the same time, the guys from rial politics, who are already known for all their giblets – sponsors, methods, agricultural tools or market past, remain in brackets.

 

The Internet, as a reflection and conductor of real life processes, not only gives rise to new tools for communication with citizens, but also serves as a medium for the birth of experts, heroes, traitors and a huge number of communities united by homogeneous values, ideas, heroes and enemies. At the same time, these same experts or enemies in the information war can actually perform a completely different function – for example, to be personal killers of a topic or public figure. There are other striking cases where real officials, absent from the Internet, are virtually unknown to citizens and fall out of the political process. Or, what’s even worse, others speak for them, creating images of good or bad heroes.

 

If you type “Ukrainian generals” into Google, the world search leader will not offer you anything good: only negative associations of queries and corresponding links. The main suggested associations would be “Leaked, stolen, incompetent or betrayal.” It is known that search results are based on people’s requests. Where does popular masochism towards the leadership of the Ukrainian army come from – we will try to figure it out.

 

For the author personally, the strangeness began one fine Thursday at the end of May 2014 – it was on that ordinary day that similar messages appeared on Facebook about three active generals of the Ukrainian army. The messages were made according to the same template: an official portrait, an official biography and evidence of the patriotic entourage skillfully inserted into the text about the horrors of theft and betrayal of exposed persons. Needless to say, all the Facebook patriots immediately picked up the waves of negativity and set sail. As it turned out – for a long time.

 

Of course, methods of analyzing the Internet environment showed the artificiality of the situation even six months ago. But right now, when the situation has frozen and the scenario for the further course of the war is being chosen, it makes sense to calm down, look at the situation from above and develop a plan. A personal plan for each citizen, political/public figure or official of their participation in countering information attacks on Ukraine.

 

Does May really mark the anniversary of the information operation to discredit the leadership of the Ukrainian army? Let’s use the methods of content analysis and identification of information operations previously described in March 2014 – “It’s in the bag” . We are building a graph of mentions of Ukrainian generals in the Infostream system since January 1, 2014, using a simple request “Ukrainian generals,” which has already become an established meme.

 

 

Let us recall the materiel. In order to detect planned artificial ones in the information noise information operations, data processing is used to detect certain patterns. Information operations, as a rule, have the shape of a curve with amplitude fluctuations of a certain shape (V. P. Gorbulin, O. G. Dodonov, D. V. Lande. Information operations and security of marriage: threats, prevention, modeling: monograph. – K.: Intertechnology, 2009. – 164 p.). This form is most closely conveyed by the so-called waveletMorlet wavelet, which is used as a template to identify similar curves in statistical data.

The data processing process consists of several stages: data smoothing (normalization by weekdays and weekends, deleting repeated tests, etc. – first diagram), application of wavelet analysis to identify possible information operations (middle picture) and determination of local maxima (skeletons). ) in the bottom diagram.

 

 

The maxima show on which day, starting from January 1, 2014, the peaks of information operations fall, and the lighter the area of the middle diagram, the more the dynamics of the information process corresponds to the shape of the wavelet we have chosen, i.e., an information attack on the Internet is likely. Knowing the dates, we can check what events in real life took place on these days.

 

Day 75 (February 26): the first information operation after the Maidan was marked by the material “War in the Dark.” The main theme is that retired Ukrainian generals coordinate the actions of neo-fascists. That is, preparations were underway for the Crimean events: preparing the population for concepts derived from fascism, on the one hand, and the launch of the “Ukrainian generals” meme, on the other.

 

150th day (July 1): resumption of the offensive in the East of Ukraine, termination of the truce. The first material is “Ukrainian generals are testing soldiers for survivability: the military is afraid of attacks.”

 

Day 180 (August 1): a lot of publications about the profitable business of Ukrainian generals. What is there to talk about in the quiet, if not about money? The topic of envy and irritation combined with theft is one of the best ways to arouse suspicion among even the most reasonable individuals. Almost simultaneously with the death of the Malaysian Boeing, a version of the insidious plan of Ukrainian generals to destroy a civilian aircraft is widely spreading.

 

Days 220–250 (August–September 2014): Ilovaisk. The most interesting thing here is the enviable synchronicity with which Ukrainian experts and resources – and all the resource soldiers of Muscovy – kill the Ukrainian generals. Moreover, to exaggerate the descriptions of the Ilovaisk cauldron, a lot of materials are launched with a description of the three boilers, how much the general’s shoulder straps cost, etc. In fact, it was during this period that the Chief of the General Staff Viktor Muzhenko became attached to the meme of “Ukrainian generals.”

 

Days 330–350 (December 2014): Donetsk airport. Everything that can be bad comes from the “Ukrainian generals” who cannot fight, negotiate and are engaged in smuggling.

 

Days 380–420 (January–February 2015): Debaltsevo. The accompanying background is “Stars of the Ukrainian Fortress Theater.” They say that Ukrainian generals are now becoming dollar millionaires in a couple of weeks. Gluttonous like cadavers. They are interested in merging the front, the soldiers, the country. And, of course, again a tragic cauldron with the death of thousands of people. What is especially intriguing on these dates is that the wording “Debaltsevo cauldron” arose long before any actual military operations in the area. Nothing prevents us from investigating the issue separately – we make a request for “Debaltsevo Boiler”.

 

 

Even without special processing, it is clear that the test injection took place on January 12, then there were two peaks of a pronounced information operation: the first was preparation, the second was the unfolding of panic, supported by “encirclement” actions.

 

The Morlet wavelet reveals two maxima of the operation. Actually, the informational essence of the operation looks quite like Sharikov’s: we surrounded them, surrounded them, surrounded them, surrounded them… Why so long and monotonous? Because they were preparing strong negotiating positions in Minsk, using both information processing and local military actions and operations.

 

In parallel with information operations against anonymous “Ukrainian generals,” special operations against specific officials are also taking place. Thus, the Chief of the General Staff, Viktor Muzhenko, lives his virtual life on the Internet – the image is formed from the words of experts, eyewitnesses, and very “military” journalists. This year alone, four peaks of unnatural information noise have been recorded.

 

In addition to impersonal sites and unknown authors, waves of reprints of negative materials, you can also analyze famous speakers speaking and writing about the war. For comparison, we can compare the number of references in materials about the Ukrainian army and its two generals.

 

 

This is exactly the case when size matters both as a percentage and in relation to the numbers of colleagues. As for me, when there is something more than 30%, then this is already a connection, and not reports, journalism or analysis. And if the tone is one-sided, then the word “order” gets its own beautiful visualization.

 

What goals are being achieved with the help of decrypted information operations? In addition to the obvious ones – the total disbelief of Ukrainian citizens in the combat effectiveness of our army, the unity of the leadership and the rank and file – an indifference “cannot do anything” is being formed and the only way out is the “third Maidan”. But there are also deeper results – for example, experts have appeared who, citing the distrust of the people and soldiers in the leadership of the army, explain that this is why Ukraine does not receive weapons from the United States: they say they will sell it, lose it, break it. Such information waves are also used by political parties during elections: to an already psychologically shaken electorate, it is much easier to “sell” the need for a change in power and leadership. You can also organize campaigns to change the leadership of the army in favor of various influential groups, including experienced sawmills.

 

The role of every conscious citizen is very high and valuable – it is for our minds and mood that the propaganda machine of the aggressor fights. And it only seems that the concrete fence on the Internet is clearly visible and tangible. Technologies of destructive patriotism work great with “useful idiots” (useful idiots are innocent morons who can be manipulated based on emotional information influences http://blogs.pravda.com.ua/authors/shnurko-tabakova/5441193920bcb/). By picking up negativity, dubious incriminating evidence, or being distracted by artificially inflated compassion, we stop engaging in constructive activities, lose inspiration, and clear and understandable goals dissolve in the fog of war. And at the very least, there is no need to reprint or refer to sources included in the ratings of participants in information operations.

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Get ready – a war with volunteers is being added to the well-formed “third Maidan” meme

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Thus, we are once again convinced that internal and external enemies have been quite consciously engaged in deliberately discrediting the leadership of the Ukrainian army for a year and a half.Methods of statistical analysis indicate the artificiality of what is happening and the effective combination of ground and information operations. These operations do not always go synchronously and are about the same thing – psychologically it is sometimes very effective to throw in negativity against the backdrop of heroism, pre-set up observers for defeat and, of course, introduce the refrain “everything is lost.” The Ukrainians have already won, the propaganda of the Russian world has not passed. All that remains is not to be exposed to pseudo-patriotic actions, which are based on genetic distrust of power, inferiority complexes and the lack of mechanisms for effective participation of civil society in the life of the country.

 

Attention! We must move away from the abyss of nihilism of everything that has been built this year. Get ready – a war with volunteers, especially those involved in reforms, is being added to the well-established “third Maidan” meme. While this material was being written, the information war with the volunteer movement was beginning to gain momentum.

 

And finally, the top 50 resources by country that have proven themselves in operations against the “Ukrainian generals.” Rating – by number of publications

 

 

Top 50 resources involved in the information operation “Debaltsevo.Kotel”: